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Corporate Governance and Employee Power in the Boardroom : An Applied Game Theoretic Analysis

The debate on employee representation on corporate boards has received considerable attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing discussion by applying power indices from game theory to examine the actual voting power of employees on boards and its effect on firm performance. Based on unique panel data on the largest listed companies in Germany, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between labor power and Tobin's Q. Moderate employee participation in corporate board decision-making can enhance firm value
Year of publication:
2020
Authors: Balsmeier, Benjamin ; Bermig, Andreas ; Dilger, Alexander
Publisher: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject: Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Macht | Power | Mitbestimmung | Codetermination | Deutschland | Germany | Aufsichtsrat | Supervisory board | Tobins Q | Tobin's Q
Description of contents: Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]
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