Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk-Dove Games

In most games, for equilibrium to result, players need to forecast the equilibrium strategies of others. We elicit forecasts of outcomes in a series of hawk-dove (aka chicken) games played by other players. We ask whether these forecasts are consistent with any correlated equilibrium of a class of the games that allow for types with pro-social preferences. Surprisingly, even though players are anonymous and randomly matched, forecasters believe that the players' actions are correlated. However, forecasts are not consistent with any correlated equilibrium

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Cason, Timothy N. ; Sharma, Tridib ; Vadovic, Radovan
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Prognoseverfahren \| Forecasting model \| Korrelation \| Correlation \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory

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