Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited

A mistake in â€œFive legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete informationâ€\x9D motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced. Copyright Springer 2006

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Forges, Françoise
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 61.2006, 4, p. 329-344
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Bayesian rationality \| correlated equilibrium \| games with incomplete information

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005678307