Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures

We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.

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Year of publication:	1988
Authors:	Geanakoplos ; Brandenburger, Adam ; Dekel, Eddie
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Correlated equilibria \| subjective priors \| bounded rationality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	CFP 819. Published in Games and Economic Behavior (1992), 4: 182-201 The price is None Number 884R 21 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593303