Corruption in PPs, incentives and contract incompleteness
Year of publication: |
January 2016
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Authors: | Iossa, Elisabetta ; Martimort, David |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 44.2016, p. 85-100
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Subject: | Corruption | Incomplete contracts | Moral hazard | Principal-agent-supervisor model | Public-private partnerships | Risk allocation | Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft | Public-private partnership | Korruption | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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