Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Baranes, Edmond ; Poudou, Jean-Christophe
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 106.2010, 3, p. 172-176
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Collusion Access Regulation Vertical structure

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551419