Cost of moral hazard and limited liability in the principal-agent problem
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Balmaceda M., Felipe ; Balseiro, S. R. ; Correa, J. R. ; Stier-Moses, N. E. |
Publisher: |
Santiago, Chile : Centro de Economía Aplicada |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Theorie | Theory |
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