Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria

We prove that for generic network formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Pimienta, Carlos ; De Sinopoli, Francesco
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Netzwerk \| Network \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (9 p)
Series:	University of New South Wales, Australian School of Business, Research Paper ; No. 2009 ECON 05
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 20, 2009 erstellt
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D85 - Network Formation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206986