Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention: a uniqueness result

This note shows that a unique mixed Nash equilibrium obtains when there are three voters in Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1983) costly voting game under complete information. Experimental investigation of this result might be interesting.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Adachi, Takanori
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2004, 2, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Abstention

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005182003