Cross Ownership, Loan Commitment, Managerial Delegation and the 'Prisoner’s Dilemma'

This paper investigates the relationship between cross ownership, sales delegation and loan commitment. We find that under sales delegation, a higher degree of cross ownership decreases the optimal bank loan interest rate, which is beneficial to the firm profits. However, cross ownership reduces the firm output, leading a lower consumer surplus and social welfare. The policy implication is that antitrust authority and banking regulatory bureau should “coordinate” policies to mitigate the concerned stakeholders' conflicts

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Ma, Jie ; Wang, Leonard F.S ; Sun, Ji
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Theorie \| Theory \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Kooperative Führung \| Participative leadership

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014238474