Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and hostile takeover threats
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard ; Pornsit Jiraporn ; Lee, Sang Mook ; Pattarake Sarajoti |
Published in: |
The quarterly review of economics and finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1062-9769, ZDB-ID 2002261-X. - Vol. 95.2024, p. 268-279
|
Subject: | Agency theory | Corporate governance | Customer concentration | Market for corporate control | Quiet life hypothesis | Takeover market | Übernahme | Takeover | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Theorie | Theory | Unternehmenskonzentration | Market concentration |
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