Damages regimes, precaution incentives, and the intensity principle
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Schweizer, Urs |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 169.2013, 4, p. 567-586
|
Subject: | Haftung | Liability | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Theorie | Theory |
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