Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

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Year of publication:	1985
Authors:	Dionne, G. ; Lasserre, P.
Institutions:	Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal
Subject:	Social Values \| Adverse Selection \| Insurance \| Risk

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages long. pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729754