Decentralization and tax competition between asymmetrical local governments : theoretical and empirical evidence
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Carbonnier, Clément |
Published in: |
Public finance review : PFR. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 1091-1421, ZDB-ID 1358400-5. - Vol. 41.2013, 4, p. 391-420
|
Subject: | fiscal federalism | tax competition | corporate taxes | public capital | Steuerwettbewerb | Tax competition | Finanzbeziehungen | Fiscal relations | Theorie | Theory | Dezentralisierung | Decentralization | Unternehmensbesteuerung | Corporate taxation | Finanzausgleich | Intergovernmental transfers | Gemeindesteuer | Local tax |
-
Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? : new evidence from local property tax competition
Crowley, George R., (2010)
-
Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? : new evidence from local property tax competition
Crowley, George R., (2011)
-
Tax decentralization and local government size
Liberati, Paolo, (2013)
- More ...
-
The optimal decentralization of public input provision for private producation
Carbonnier, Clément, (2011)
-
Shifting on prices of per unit and ad valorem consumption taxes
Carbonnier, Clément, (2011)
-
Faut-il élargir les allègements de cotisations sociales aux salaires élevés ?
Carbonnier, Clément, (2013)
- More ...