Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical test

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.

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Year of publication:	2008-01
Authors:	Dreher, Axel ; Fischer, Justina A.V.
Institutions:	School of Economics and Political Science, Universität St. Gallen
Subject:	Terrorism \| Decentralization \| Democracy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	31 pages
Classification:	D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H70 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations. General ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005200683