Decentralizing aid with interested parties

This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Foreign aid \| rent seeking \| governance \| decentralization

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2006-29
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	566319551 [GVK] hdl:10419/31263 [Handle] RePEc:rut:rutres:200629 [RePEc]
Classification:	O10 - Economic Development. General ; O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; F35 - Foreign Aid ; O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; C23 - Models with Panel Data ; O47 - Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity ; E21 - Consumption; Saving ; E22 - Capital; Investment (including Inventories); Capacity
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266336