Decision-maker beliefs and the sunk-cost fallacy : Major League Baseball’s final-offer salary arbitration and utilization
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Keefer, Quinn A. W. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic psychology : research in economic psychology and behavioral economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-4870, ZDB-ID 865181-4. - Vol. 75.2019, 2, p. 1-16
|
Subject: | Final-offer arbitration | Labor utilization | Major League Baseball | Sunk-cost fallacy | Profisport | Professional sports | Ballsport | Ball game | Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit | Arbitration | Schlichtung | Conciliation |
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