Decision-making in organizations : when to delegate and whom to delegate
Year of publication: |
June 2016
|
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Authors: | Ambec, Stefan ; Poitevin, Michel |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 20.2016, 2, p. 115-143
|
Subject: | Organizations | Mechanism design | Decentralization | Incentives | Non-commitment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Entscheidung | Decision | Dezentralisierung | Unternehmensorganisation | Business organization | Organisationsstruktur | Organizational structure | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Dezentrale Organisation | Decentralized organization |
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