Deductible or co-insurance: Which is the better insurance contract under adverse selection?
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Breuer, Michael |
Publisher: |
Zurich : University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute |
Subject: | Insurance | Adverse Selection | Deductible | Co-Insurance |
Series: | Working Paper ; 0401 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 381750582 [GVK] hdl:10419/76168 [Handle] |
Classification: | D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D62 - Externalities |
Source: |
-
Deductible or Co-Insurance: Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse Selection?
Breuer, Michael, (2004)
-
Optimal insurance contracts without the non-negativity constraint on indemnities revisited
Breuer, Michael, (2004)
-
Optimal Insurance Contracts without the Non-Negativity Constraint on Indemnities Revisited
Breuer, Michael, (2004)
- More ...
-
Plädoyer für risikogerechte Prämien in der Krankenversicherung
Zweifel, Peter, (2003)
-
Wie viel Marktwirtschaft für das deutsche Gesundheitswesen?
Neubauer, Günther, (2002)
-
Optimal insurance contracts without the non-negativity constraint on indemnities revisited
Breuer, Michael, (2004)
- More ...