Delegated expertise - when are good projects bad news?
Eberhard Feess; Markus Walzl
| Year of publication: |
2004
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Feess, Eberhard ; Walzl, Markus |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 82.2004, 1, p. 77-82
|
| Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Experten | Experts | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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