Delegated Portfolio Management, No Churning, and Relative Performance-Based Incentive/Sorting Schemes.

We show that optimal delegated portfolio management contracts-which serve to screen out uninformed agents and reward potentially informed agents sufficiently to compensate their opportunity and/or effort costs-need not imply churning, or randomised trading if uninformed, by the able screened agents, despite limited liability for them which limits the amount of screenable heterogeneity among agents.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Bhattacharya, S.
Institutions:	Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.
Subject:	INVESTMENTS \| PORTFOLIO \| FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS \| STOCK MARKET

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Series:	Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	16 pages
Classification:	G11 - Portfolio Choice ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474747