Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy

by Michael Kuhn

Year of publication:	May 2004 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
Other Persons:	Kuhn, Michael (contributor)
Institutions:	University of York / Department of Economics and Related Studies (contributor)
Publisher:	York : Dep. of Economics and Related Studies, Univ. of York
Subject:	Allokation \| Allocation \| Organisation \| Organization \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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