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Delegating relational contracts to corruptible intermediarie

Marta Troya-Martinez, Liam Wren-Lewis
Year of publication:
[2016]
Authors: Troya-Martinez, Marta ; Wren-Lewis, Liam
Publisher: Paris : Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
Subject: Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Korruption | Corruption | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vermittlungstätigkeit | Intermediation | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive
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