Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 2, p. 405-407
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Relational contracts \| Delegation \| Monitoring \| Job design \| Moral hazard in teams

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041610