Dependence in Private Values and Efficiency in Bilateral Trade.

In a bargaining model with dependent private information, I extend the result on existence of efficient mechanisms allowing any distribution of the surplus among traders. This generalization introduces flexibility into the model since full surplus extraction by one trader is incompatible with ex post individual rationality.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Kosmopoulou, Georgia
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2001, 9, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Bilateral Trade

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181842