Designing coalition-based fair and stable pricing mechanisms under private information on consumers' reservation prices
Year of publication: |
1 January 2019
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Authors: | Cadre, Hélène le ; Pagnoncelli, Bernardo ; Homem-de-Mello, Tito ; Beaude, Olivier |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 272.2019, 1 (1.1.), p. 270-291
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Subject: | OR in energy | Coalition formation | Game theory | Load scheduling | Forecast algorithm | Spieltheorie | Koalition | Coalition | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Konsumentenverhalten | Consumer behaviour |
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