Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology

A pollution reduction program is designed where information about both techno logy and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for selfselection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.

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Year of publication:	2001-07
Authors:	Petterson, Jeffrey M. ; Boisvert, Richard N.
Institutions:	Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University
Subject:	Risk and Uncertainty

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Department of Applied Economics and Management>Working Papers Number 127661
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010882364