Determinants and consequences of clawback provisions in management compensation contracts : a structured literature review on empirical evidence
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Velte, Patrick |
Published in: |
Business research. - Heidelberg : Springer, ISSN 2198-2627, ZDB-ID 2426376-X. - Vol. 13.2020, 3, p. 1417-1450
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Subject: | Board composition | Management compensation | Financialrestatements | Earnings management | Clawbacks | Principal agenttheory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vorstand | Executive board | Lohn | Wages |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s40685-020-00135-9 [DOI] hdl:10419/233201 [Handle] |
Classification: | M41 - Accounting ; M48 - Government Policy and Regulation ; Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation ; Q56 - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounting |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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