Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints

Felix Jarman (University of Mannheim), Vincent Meisner (Technical University Berlin)

This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Jarman, Felix ; Meisner, Vincent
Publisher:	Munich, Germany : Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190
Subject:	Mechanism Design \| Revelation Principle \| Ex-post Constraints \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Mathematische Optimierung \| Mathematical programming \| Offenbarte Präferenzen \| Revealed preferences \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Öffentlicher Auftrag \| Public contract

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 7 Seiten)
Series:	Discussion paper. - München : Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, ZDB-ID 2881680-8. - Vol. no. 32 (May 20, 2017)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/185702 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011697514