Disciplining delegated monitors : when venture capitalists fail to prevent fraud by their IPO firms
Year of publication: |
April/May 2016
|
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Authors: | Tian, Xuan ; Udell, Gregory F. ; Yu, Xiaoyun |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 61.2016, 2/3, p. 526-544
|
Subject: | Financial misreporting | Corporate fraud | Initial public offerings | Financial intermediaries | Reputation | Venture capital | Börsengang | Initial public offering | Risikokapital | Betrug | Fraud | Finanzintermediation | Financial intermediation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Bilanzdelikt | Accounting fraud | Wirtschaftskriminalität | Economic crime | Unternehmensfinanzierung | Corporate finance | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Emissionsgeschäft | Underwriting business |
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