Distributed Cognition in Collective Environmental Decision-Making

This paper offers a perspective of constructing a normative model for collective environmental decision-making which aims at reconciling the tension between technocracy and democracy.Drawing on literatures in social choice theory / theory of judgment aggregation, I illustrate how the idea of ‘distributed cognition', recently discussed also in sociology, law, computer science and the philosophy of science, illuminates insights on allocating judgmental powers among individual agents with varying levels of competence. I begin with how we may model collective decision-making in general. Then, based on certain platitudinous normative conditions of environmental decision-making, I introduce an ‘anti-democratic' result from the theory of judgment aggregation and show how we may determine a minimal benchmark for resolving the ‘technocratic-democratic' divide without retrogressing to a purely dictatorial procedure. Next, I illustrate what model options are available upon fulfilling the benchmark. The upshot is that a model based on distributed cognition is logically possible and normatively desirable, which appropriately balances the demands of inclusion and equality as in democracy with maximizing overall epistemic performance as in technocracy.The theoretical foundation of such model offers a starting point for institutionalizing democracy for collective environmental decision-making in practice