Do audit committees reduce the agency costs of ownership structure?
Year of publication: |
November 2015
|
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Authors: | Cai, Charlie X. ; Hillier, David ; Tian, Gaoliang ; Wu, Qinghua |
Published in: |
Pacific-Basin finance journal. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0927-538X, ZDB-ID 1343420-2. - Vol. 35.2015, 1, p. 225-240
|
Subject: | State-owned enterprises | Corporate governance | Auditing | Audit committee | Ownership pyramids | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Corporate Governance | Prüfungsausschuss des Aufsichtsrats | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vorstand | Executive board | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit |
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