Do effort differences between bonus and penalty contracts persist in labor markets?
George C. Gonzalez, Vicky B. Hoffman, Donald V. Moser
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Gonzalez, George C. ; Hoffman, Vicky B. ; Moser, Donald V. |
| Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 95.2020, 3, p. 205-222
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| Subject: | bonus and penalty contracts | choice | effort | endogeneity | framing | labor market | loss aversion | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Strafe | Punishment | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Arbeitsmarkt | Labour market | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.2308/accr-52655 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012254240