Do executives benefit from shareholder disputes? : evidence from multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed firms
Year of publication: |
August 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fang, Yuanli ; Hu, Maggie Rong ; Yang, Qingsen |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 51.2018, p. 275-315
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Subject: | Multiple large shareholders | Shareholder identity | Excess compensation | Chinese firms | China | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Aktiengesellschaft | Listed company | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Großaktionäre | Large shareholders |
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