Do family owners hold nonfamily CEOs more accountable than family ceos for firm performance? : a dynamic perspective
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Shen, Wei ; Gu, Qian ; Lu, Lin-Hua |
Subject: | agency contract | family firms | CEO turnover | performance assessment | socioemotional wealth | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Führungswechsel | Executive turnover | Unternehmensnachfolge | Succession planning | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Familie | Family |
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