Do hard pegs avoid currency crises? An evaluation using matching estimators
Using the bias-corrected matching estimators of Abadie and Imbens (2006) as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we estimate the average treatment effect of hard pegs on the occurrence of currency crises. We find the evidence that hard pegs significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Esaka, Taro |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 113.2011, 1, p. 35-38
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Exchange rate regimes Hard pegs Currency crises Self-selection bias Matching estimators |
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