Do large cabinets favor large governments?: Evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Schaltegger, Christoph A. ; Feld, Lars P. |
Publisher: |
Marburg : Philipps-Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Subject: | Finanzpolitik | Regierung | Regierungskoalition | Staatsquote | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Regelgebundene Politik | Referendum | Schweiz | Fragmentation | Fiscal Policy | Referendums | Legislative Rules | Budget Rules |
Series: | Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge ; 2004,21 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 506415252 [GVK] hdl:10419/29843 [Handle] |
Classification: | E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization ; H61 - Budget; Budget Systems |
Source: |
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Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Feld, Lars P., (2004)
-
Do large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A., (2004)
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions
Feld, Lars P., (2021)
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Are fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized governments?
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