Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? - When and Why Dismissing a Manager Increases the Subordinates' Performance
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Höffler, Felix ; Sliwka, Dirk |
Published in: | |
Publisher: |
Universität <Köln> / Seminar für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Personalwirtschaftslehre |
Subject: | Führungskraft | Asymmetrische Information | asmmetric informatin | Umsatz | Performanz | Entlassung | temporary layoffs |
Extent: | 258048 bytes 14 p. application/pdf |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Language: | English |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; Strategic management ; Personnel management, Personnel planning and Personnel development ; Personnel psychology ; Individual Articles ; Germany. General Resources |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
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