Do related party transactions always deteriorate earnings informativeness?
Ching-Lung Chen, Chung-Yu Chen, Pei-Yu Weng
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Chen, Ching-Lung ; Chen, Chung-Yu ; Weng, Pei-Yu |
| Published in: |
The North American journal of economics and finance : a journal of financial economics studies. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408, ZDB-ID 1289278-6. - Vol. 54.2020, p. 1-19
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| Subject: | Agency theory | Contracting | Earnings informativeness | related party transactions (RPTs) | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Gewinn | Profit | Vertrag | Contract | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.najef.2020.101270 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665105