Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? : an experimental test of adverse selection theory
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Hoppe, Eva I. ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 89.2015, p. 17-33
|
Subject: | Mechanism design | Incentive theory | Private information | Laboratory experiment | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Experiment | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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