Do the contingencies of external monitoring, ownership incentives, or free cash flow explain opposing firm performance expectations?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Wright, Peter L. ; Kroll, Mark J. ; Mukherji, Ananda ; Pettus, Michael L. |
Published in: |
Journal of management & governance. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1385-3457, ZDB-ID 1375940-1. - Vol. 13.2009, 3, p. 215-243
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Cash Flow | Cash flow | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Führungskräfte | Managers |
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