Does a Rise in Maximal Fines Increase or Decrease the Optimal Level of Deterrence?

The economic literature on crime and law enforcement shows that the optimal level of deterrence increases when maximal fines rise. This paper shows that this view may be incorrect. In particular, if the gains from crime can be disgorged, as is usually the case in reality, then increasing the maximal fine may reduce the optimal level of deterrence. This may happen if offenders' wealth is less than the monetary value of the harm that offenders cause.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Tabbach, Avraham
Published in:	Review of Law & Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 5.2009, 1, p. 3-3
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	Crime \| Deterrence \| Law Enforcement \| Maximal Fines \| Disgorgement of Illegal Gains

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress.com:rle-1245
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005046348