Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?
Lisa Bruttel, Vasilisa Petrishcheva
| Year of publication: |
[2024]
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Bruttel, Lisa Verena ; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa |
| Publisher: |
Potsdam : University of Potsdam |
| Subject: | beliefs | communication | experiment | prisoner's dilemma | strategic uncertainty | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Kommunikation | Communication | Experiment | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Interne Kommunikation | Internal communication | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten, 691 KB) Illustrationen |
|---|---|
| Series: | CEPA discussion papers. - Potsdam : Center for Economic Policy Analysis, University of Potsdam, ISSN 2628-653X, ZDB-ID 2969685-9. - Vol. no. 74 (March 2024) |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior – belief precision. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication. |
| Other identifiers: | 10.25932/publishup-62936 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014492098