Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?.

In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when marching is assortative and sellers' investment precede market competition the investments are constrained efficient.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Felli, L. ; Roberts, K.
Institutions:	Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Subject:	COMPETITION \| MARKET STRUCTURE

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Series:	Economics Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	54 pages
Classification:	D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D41 - Perfect Competition
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730308