Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation?
Paula Castro, Kevin Keasey, Borja Amor-Tapia, Maria T. Tascon, Francesco Vallascas
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Castro, Paula ; Keasey, Kevin ; Amor-Tapia, Borja ; Tascon, Maria T. ; Vallascas, Francesco |
| Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 64.2020, p. 1-24
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| Subject: | Debt concentration | Executive compensation | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Schuldenmanagement | Debt management | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101684 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012295965