Does Divorce Law Matter?

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

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Year of publication:	2002-03
Authors:	Fella, Giulio ; Manzini, Paola ; Mariotti, Marco
Institutions:	School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary
Subject:	Bargaining \| Divorce \| Non transferability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 454
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976633