Does Efficient Deterrence Require that the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice?

It has been argued that there will be more efficient deterrence if no restrictions are placed on the ability of the rich to buy better legal representation than the poor when accused of a crime: such restrictions lead to over-deterrence of the wealthy. We show that the conclusion does not hold when account is taken of the effect of restrictions on legal defence expenditure on the extent of under-deterrence.

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Authors:	Garoupa, Nuno ; Gravelle, Hugh
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	Portuguese
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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