Does non-controlling large shareholder monitoring improve CEO incentives?
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hui, Zhiyang ; Fang, Hongyan |
Subject: | blockholder identity | emerging markets | Non-controlling large shareholder | pay-performance sensitivity | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Schwellenländer | Emerging economies | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Börsenkurs | Share price |
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