Does Poor Legal Enforcement Make Households Credit-Constrained?
Year of publication: |
2003-01-30
|
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Authors: | Fabbri, Daniela ; Padula, Mario |
Institutions: | Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> ; National Centre of Competence in Research North South <Bern> |
Subject: | Wirtschaftliche Sicherheit | Kreditaufnahme |
Extent: | 870400 bytes 48 p. application/pdf |
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Series: | Working Paper ; No. 35 (2003) |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation ; K12 - Contract Law ; K41 - Litigation Process ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Corporate finance and investment policy. General ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
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