Does referral-based hiring exacerbate agency problems?
| Year of publication: |
2023
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hung, Chung Yu ; Lillis, Anne M. ; Wu, Anne |
| Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 98.2023, 2, p. 277-297
|
| Subject: | employee selection | referrals | financial incentives | distorted effort allocation | multitasks | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Personalauswahl | Personnel selection | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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